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USING MICROCOMPUTERS AND P/G% TO PREDICT
COURT CASES
by
STUART S. NAGEL*
The purpose of this article is to analyze a microcomputer program that
can process a set of (1) prior cases, (2) predictive criteria for distinguishing
among the cases, and (3) the relations between each prior case and each
criterion in order to arrive at an accurate decision rule. Such a rule will enable
all the prior cases to be predicted without inconsistencies, and thereby max-
imize the likelihood of accurately predicting future cases. To illustrate the pro-
gram, this article uses five substantive fields, including the predicting of cases
dealing with religion in the public schools, legislative redistricting, housing
discrimination, international law, and criminal law.!
THE GENERAL METHODOLOGY
The predictive methodology on which the computer program is based in-
volves six key elements:
1. Listing the cases or casetypes which are to be analyzed.
2. Listing the tentative criteria to aid in explaining why some cases were
decided one way and other cases were decided differently. That listing
might also involve indicating the relative importance of each criterion.
3. Listing how each case scores on each of those predictive criteria. That
listing can use whatever measurement units seem comfortable, such as
a yes-no dichotomy, a 1-5 scale, years, dollars, apples, etc.
4. Summing the scores for each case across the criteria in order to give
each case an overall score. Doing so might involve transforming the
raw scores into dimensionless part/whole percentages.
5. Relating the set of summation scores for the cases to the actual or
presumed outcomes of those past cases or casetypes. One can thereby
develop a decision rule indicating the summation scores that are
associated with certain kinds of outcomes.
6. Doing a sensitivity analysis whereby one determines how the decision
rule, the presence of inconsistencies, or a litigation strategy might be
affected by changes in the cases, criteria, weights, relations, measure-
ment units, or other inputs.
*Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; member of the Illinois Bar. B.S., 1957, J.D., 1958,
Ph.D., 1961, Northwestern University.
'On traditional legal prediction, see H. JONES, J. KERNOCHAN & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD (1980); K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); W. STATSKY & J. WERNET, CASE
ANALYSIS AND FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL WRITING (1977); and E. THODE, L. LEBowITz & L. MAZOR, IN.
TRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAw (1970). On behavioral statistical prediction as applied to court cases, see
J. GROSSMAN & J. TANENHAUS, FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (1969); G. SCHUBERT, JUDICAL BEHAVIOR:
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The program is called Policy/Goal Percentaging Analysis (PIG%) because
it was originally designed to relate alternative legal policies to goals to be
achieved. The program can be easily extended to relating prior cases to predic-
tive criteria. The word "percentaging" is used in the title of the program,
because the program uses part/whole percentages in order to handle the prob-
lem of goals or predictive criteria being measured on different dimensions. The
measurement units are converted into a system of percentages showing the
relative position of each case on each criterion, rather than work with a system
of dollars, apples, years, miles, or other measurement scores.
Each set of substantive cases is designed to illustrate a different variation
on the six key elements as follows:
1. The cases dealing with religion in the public schools involve casetypes,
rather than actual cases. They also involve only one way of measuring
the predictive criteria, namely a simple yes-no dichotomy.
2. The legislative redistricting cases involve specific cases, rather than
casetypes. They especially illustrate resolving inconsistencies in how
the cases were decided.
3. The housing discrimination cases illustrate how the program deals
with multiple ways of measuring the predictive criteria.
4. The international law cases involve a continuum outcome like dam-
ages, sentences, or probabilities, rather than just winning or losing.
5. The criminal cases deal with multiple weights for the predictive
criteria.
This article is designed to discuss a methodology that is helpful in arriving
at accurate predictions of court cases. Making accurate predictions, however,
depends on a number of factors in addition to having a good predictive
methodology. Those factors include:
1. A knowledge of the subject matter.
2. Previous prediction experiences.
3. The Stimulus of having a lot at stake, depending on the accuracy of
the predictions.
4. Requiring written analysis justifying one's predictions.
5. Clarity as to what one is predicting.
6. Being a positive thinker with regard to one's ability to predict.
7. Being explicit about one's predictive criteria.
8. Having a relevant set of cases on which to base one's predictions.
9. Being accurate in how the cases are positioned on each of the predic-
tive criteria.
10. Being capable of seeing relations and reasoning by analogy.
A READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH (1964); H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT POLICY MAKING: EXPLANATION
AND PREDICTION (1979); and S. ULMER, COURTS, LAW AND JUDICIAL PROCESS (1981).
[Vol. 18:4
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11. Having a knowledge of predictive methodologies, such as P/G%,
multiple regression, and staircase prediction, which are compared in
this article.2
CASETYPES, UNI-DIMENSIONALITY, AND RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Table 1 contains data for predicting cases dealing with religion in the
public schools. This simple example can serve well to illustrate the six key
elements. They are referred to as elements, rather than steps, because they are
developed in a cyclical way, rather than a sequential way. That means subse-
quent elements tend to lead to revising the previous elements in a series of
repeated cycles. The process continues until one is satisfied that the elements
make sense in light of the user's purposes and the overall criterion of 100 per-
cent accuracy in predicting or post-dicting the cases on which the decision rule
is based.
TABLE 1
Data for Predicting Cases Dealing with Religion in the Public Schools3
Criteria
School School
Time Building Purpose Sum' Outcome5
Casetypes
1. Educational Purpose
Off School Time 1 1 1 3 C
Out of School Building
2. Educational Purpose
Off School Time 1 2 1 4 C
In School Building
'On the general methodology of policy/goal percentaging analysis as applied to both prescription and predic-
tion, see S. NAGEL, PUBLIC POLICY: GOALS, MEANS, AND METHODS. 343-54 (1984); Nagel, Part/Whole
Percentaging as a Useful Tool in Policy/Program Evaluation, 8 EVALUATION & PROGRAM PLANNING (1985);
Nagel, P/G% Analysis: An Evaluation-Aiding Tool Program, 9 EVALUATION REV. 209 (1985); and Nagel,
"Policy/Goal Percentaging Analysis: A Decision-Aiding Tool" (microcomputer manual available from the
author on request, 1984). The cases to be listed can be found through manual legal search methods or
through accessing the microcomputer data bases of such systems as LEXIS or WESTLAW. Listing predic-
tive criteria generally requires a knowledge of the cases, the subject matter, and other factors mentioned
above. Experiments are now being conducted on the extent to which microcomputer data bases can be used
to help generate predictive criteria.
'The above data comes from Nagel, Case Prediction by Staircase Tables and Percentaging. 25 JURIMETRICS
168 (1985).
'The decision rule which the above data generates is: (I) If a case dealing with religion in the public schools
has a summation score of 5 or less, the arrangements will be found constitutional. (2) With a summation
score of 6 or more, the arrangements will be found unconstitutional.
The leading case is Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). It involved a summation score of 5, and the
arrangement was found constitutional. Therefore, one would expect constitutionality to be found with
scores lower than 5.
'A "U" in the outcome column means the arrangement is found unconstitutional. A "C" means the arrange-
ment is found constitutional. The Zorach case is Casetype 7, and the McCullom is Casetype 8.
Spring, 1985]
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
Data for Predicting Cases Dealing with Religion in the Public Schools
Criteria
School School
Time Building Purpose Sum Outcome
Casetypes
3. Educational Purpose
On School Time 2 1 1 4 C
Out of School Building
4. Religious Indoctrination
Off School Time 1 1 2 4 C6
Out of the School Building
5. Educational Purpose
On School Time 2 2 1 5 C
In School Building
6. Religious Indoctrination
Off School Time 1 2 2 5 C
In the School Building
7. Religious Indoctrination
On School Time 2 1 2 5 C
Out of the School Building
8. Religious Indoctrination
On School Time 2 2 2 6 U
In the School Building
The cases listed on the rows of Table 1 are not specific cases, except for
Case 7 which is Zorach v. Clauson7 , and Case 8 which is McCollum v. Board
of Education'. Instead the "cases" are casetypes formed by combining the
categories on the three predictive criteria. The first predictive criterion is
whether the religious activity was on school time. A "yes" scores 2, and a "no"
scores 1. The second predictive criterion is whether the religious activity was
within the school building, with a yes scoring 2 and a no scoring 1. The third
criterion is whether the purpose of the religious activity is for indoctrination
(i.e., instilling or strengthening religious beliefs) (scored 2), or is for education
as in a course on comparative literature or cultural geography (scored 1). A
high score or a 2 on each predictive criterion indicates a score in the direction
of unconstitutionality for these cases. Thus with three predictive criteria, each
'he Outcome of Case 4 is known from the case of McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
'343 U.S. 306 (1952).
8333 U.S. 203 (1948).
[Vol. 18:4
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of which is a yes-no dichotomy, there can be eight casetypes or possible com-
binations of the categories. Those casetypes are listed in the first column in the
order of the summation scores for each casetype. Where two casetypes have
the same summation scores, they are listed alphabetically.
After clarifying the cases or casetypes and the predictive criteria, the third
element involves showing the relations between each case/casetype and each
predictive criterion. That is easy here since the definition of each casetype
shows how it is positioned on each criterion. The fourth element involves sum-
ming the relation scores in order to obtain an overall score for each case. That
is also easy here since the raw scores can be summed, because all the predictive
criteria are measured on the same 1-2 scale. We therefore do not have a prob-
lem of multi-dimensionality which is present when we try to add apples to
oranges, years to dollars, or a 1-2 scale to a 1-5 scale.
The fifth element involves relating the summation scores to the outcomes
in the form of a decision rule. Predictive decison rules in this context have the
form, "If a case has a summation score of __ or more, then predict a decision
of __ ; and if a case has a summation score of __ or less, then predict an op-
posite decision. To aid in developing decision rules, the computer program ar-
ranges the casetypes in the order of their summation scores with ties broken
alphabetically. Before the computer calculates the summation scores, it asks
the user for (1) the labels for the casetypes or the names for the specific cases,
(2) the labels for the predictive criteria, (3) an indication whether the criteria
are all measured the same way or differently, and (4) the relative importance or
weights of the criteria. Here the criteria are weighted equally, meaning they
each receive a weight of 1. Where differential weights are involved, those
weights are used to multiply the relation scores in order to work with weighted
relation scores and thus weighted summation scores.
A sixth and especially important piece of information is the outcome for
each case or casetype. That is normally easy information to provide where
specific cases are involved. Where casetypes are involved as here, deductive
reasoning may be needed to indicate the outcomes for those casetypes that do
not correspond to specific cases. For example, in Zorach,9 the Supreme Court
upheld religious indoctrination on school time although not in the school
building. The Court would then surely uphold religious indoctrination not on
school time and not in the school building which is Casetype 4. In other words,
if a case wins with an unfavorable score on Criterion A and a favorable score
on Criterion B, then it is even more likely to win with a favorable score on
Criterion A if all other variables are held constant. This is known as afortiori
reasoning. One can similarly deduce Casetype 1 where all three variables are
favorable, and Casetype 3 where two variables are favorable rather than just
one, and the one unfavorable variable has not changed. Another form of afor-
9343 U.S. 306 (1952).
USING MICROCOMPUTERSSpring, 19851
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tiori reasoning which is not present here is to say if a case loses with a
favorable score on Criterion A, then it will lose even more with an unfavorable
score on Criterion A if everything else is held constant.
Likewise, if the Court explicitly says or implies that being on or off school
time and in or out of the school building are of approximately equal impor-
tance, then one can deduce Casetype 2 and Casetype 6 since they interchange
the scores on those two variables as compared to the Zorach0 Casetype 7. Also
if the Court explicitly says or implies that an educational purpose provides an
exemption from unconstitutionality, then we can deduce that Casetype 5 will
be found constitutional, as well as Casetypes 1, 2, and 3. Casetype 8 does not
have to be deduced since it corresponds to the specific case of McCullom v.
Board of Education." If that case had not been decided, one would predict un-
constitutionality from language that implies being in an unfavorable position
on all three variables, crossing the threshold of unconstitutionality. When the
outcome column has been completed, one should have no trouble seeing that
the data generates a decision rule saying that if a case has a summation score
of 6 or more, then predict a decision of unconstitutionality; and if a case has a
summation score of 5 or less, then predict a decision of constitutionality.
As an example of sensitivity analysis in this substantive context, one
could add a fourth variable such as whether or not the program is voluntary.
We would then have 16 casetypes since we would have four dichotomous
variables which lend themselves to 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 or 16 casetypes. The relations
would still be determined by the definitions of the casetypes. Adding that
fourth variable brings in the concept of violating a constitutional constraint, in
the sense that all eight casetypes where the program is not voluntary would be
unconstitutional. In other words, having a compulsory religious program is
enough to generate an unconstitutionality decision, regardless of how the
casetype is scored on the other three variables, even if the program is educa-
tional rather than doctrinal. A sensitivity analysis, however, is subject to
change when the new inputs actually occur in a future case. Those new cases
can then become part of the dataset that is used to develop and revise the deci-
sion rules.
SPECIFIC CASES, RESOLVING INCONSISTENCIES, AND LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING
A. Analyzing the Specific Cases
Table 2 contains data for predicting legislative redistricting cases. The
cases listed on the rows are all specific cases, rather than casetypes. They are
'od.
"333 U.S. 203 11948).
'
2Cases dealing with religion in the public schools are discussed in N. DORSEN, P. BENDER, & B. NEUBOINE.
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, (1976), [hereinafter cited as N. DORSENJI, H. PRITCH-
ETr, CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES 150-54 (1984). For further details on predicting civil liberties cases
quantitatively, see Nagel, Predicting Court Cases Quantitively, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1411 (1965).
[Vol. 18:4
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the most important legislative redistricting cases decided in the United States
by various courts from Colegrove v. Green,3 through Baker v. Carr'. The
cases are arranged in the order of their summation scores. That happens to be
roughly the same as the chronological order of the cases, which shows that the
cases became more favorable toward ordering redistricting as one moved from
Colegrove to Baker.
TABLE 2
Data for Predicting Redistricting Cases 5
Criteria'7
Equality State Equality Federal Sum" Outcome
Requirement Legislature Violation Court
Casetypes"s
1. Colegrove9  1 1 1 2 5 D
2. Grills'°  2 2 1 1 6 A
3. Maryland2  1 2 2 1 6 D
4. Schollen  1 2 2 1 6 D
5. WMCA 23 1 2 1 2 6 D
6. Asbury 4  2 2 2 1 7 A
7. Dyer25  2 1 2 2 7 A
8. Baker26  2 2 2 2 8 A
9. Magraw27  2 2 2 2 8 A
3328 U.S. 549 (1946).
14369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"
5The above date comes from Nagel, Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction, 42 TEx. L. REV.
1006-17 (1964).
"The decision rule which the above data generates is: (1) If a redistricting case during the time period
covered has a summation score of 7 or above, the attacker wins. (2) With a summation score of 6 or below,
the defender wins. That decision rule generates one inconsistent case. The inconsistency can be eliminated
by: (1) Changing the decision rule to say a summation score of 6 leads to an unclear outcome. (2) Giving the
first variable a weight of 2, which would be consistent with the importance of requiring equality. (3) Adding
a fifth variable called "Decided After the Maryland Case." (4) Eliminating the Grills case, but that does not
seem justifiable. (5) Changing the measurement on the first variable from no-yes to a 1-3 scale and giving
Grills a score of 3. (6) Finding that Grills really deserves a 2 on the third or fourth variables.
"A one in columns one through four equals no. A two in columns one through four equals yes. An "A" in
the outcome column means the attacker wins. A "D" means the defender wins.
" When working with cases, rather than casetypes, inconsistencies are likely to occur that need resolving.
'gColegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"Grills v. Anderson, 29 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Ind. 1961).
2 Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Towes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
"Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. I, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), vacated, 369 U.S. 429 (1962) reh'g denied, 370 U.S.
906 (1962), on remand, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), cert denied, Beadle v. Scholle, 377 U.S. 990
(1964).
'
3W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"Asbury Park Press v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
"Dyer v. Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii, 1956).
'Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
Spring, 19851
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There are four predictive criteria. As with the cases dealing with religion
in the public schools, all four criteria are measured using a yes-no dichotomy.
The first variable asks whether the relevant constitution expressly requires
districts of equal population per representative. The Colegrove case, for exam-
ple, involved Congressional redistricting.28 The federal Constitution does not
expressly require equality.29 On the contrary, it expressly requires that each
state have at least one representative, no matter how small the state might be?0
Equality for Congressional districting has been read into the federal Constitu-
tion by way of finding it implicit in the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Baker
case, on the other hand, involved Tennessee state legislative-redistricting.31
The Tennessee Constitution does explicitly require equality, which had been
ignored for years by the refusal of the state legislature to redistrict.32
The second variable asks whether a state or federal legislature is involved.
A state legislature is scored 2, and the federal legislature is scored 1. State
legislatures are more likely to be ordered to redistrict because the courts (at
least in those early years) seemed to show more respect for not upsetting Con-
gress. Oliver Wendell Holmes had said the federal system could survive if Con-
gress violated the Constitution, but not if the states did so. The third variable
refers to the degree of equality violation. If less than 35% of the state's popula-
tion can choose more than 50% of the state legislature, then the equality viola-
tion is high (scored 2). If more than 35% of the state's population is required to
choose more than 50% of the state legislature, then the equality violation is
relatively low (scored 1). The fourth variable asks whether a federal or state
court is deciding the case. One would expect a federal court to be more likely to
decide in favor of redistricting in view of the lifetime appointment of federaljudges, which makes them less susceptible to pressure from the dominant
political party.
With nine cases and four predictive criteria, there are 36 relations. They
are shown in the cells of Table 2. Those relation scores can be objectively
determined, as are the relation scores in most court case prediction. The fourth
key element in the predictive analysis involves summing the relation scores for
each case and arranging the cases in the order of their summation scores. The
minimum summation score is 4 for a case that scores I on all four variables.
There was no such case which is a further indication that we are dealing with
actual cases, rather than casetypes. The Colegrove case comes closest with a
score of 5. The maximum score possible is 8 for a case that scores 2 on all four
variables. Baker is an example of that casetype.
-328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"Id. at 551.
"Id. at 556.
3-369 U.S. 186 (1962).
'Md. at 207-08.
[Vol. 18:4
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With actual specific cases, the prior outcomes are generally easy to deter-
mine. Of these nine cases, five were decided in favor of the party attacking the
existing apportionment, and four in favor of the party defending it. The deci-
sion rule which the data generates is that if a redistricting case during the time
period covered has a summation score of 7 or above, the attacker wins. With a
summation score of 6 or below, the defender wins. That decision rule, how-
ever, results in at least one inconsistency. This is so because four cases received
scores of 6 apiece, and one of the four resulted in a victory for the attacker
when the other three were won by the defender of the existing redistricting.
B. Resolving the Inconsistencies
The P/G% system provides methods whereby the system can guarantee
100% accuracy in predicting the past cases on which the decision rule is based.
This is the equivalent in statistical regression analysis of guaranteeing there
will be no residuals or differences between predicted scores and actual scores
where one is predicting winning or losing. It is possible that there are some realinconsistencies across cases, judges, places, or time periods. The philosophy of
the P/G% approach, however, assumes that the inconsistencies are only on the
surface, and that if one does a better analysis of the cases, criteria, relations,
weights, measures, and other inputs, then the inconsistencies will disappear.
The P/G% approach facilitates such an analysis by enabling the user to easily
determine the effects of changes in those inputs and by allowing for variables
that refer to when, where, and by whom the cases were decided.
There are at least six ways of resolving what otherwise would be inconsis-
tencies or residuals. Taking them in random order as applied to Table 2, one
can change the decision rule to say a summation score of 7 or above leads to
the attacker winning; a summation score of 5 or below leads to the defender
winning; and a summation score of 6 leads to an unclear result. There would
then be no inconsistencies since a summation score of 6 could then accommo-
date both an A and a D for its outcome. That approach, is, however, unde-
sirable, because it may declare too many cases to be unpredictable. In this ex-
ample, an undesirable four out of the nine cases would become unpredictable.
A more meaningful approach is to give the first criterion a weight of 2.
That would have the effect of doubling all the numbers in that column before
the summing is done. Doing so would mean the new summation scores would
be 6, 8, 7, 7, 7, 9, 9, 10, and 10 respectively. The new decision rule would then
be that a summation score of 8 or above leads to a redistricting order and a
summation score of 7 or below leads to such an order being denied. In other
words, each case that scored 1 on the equality requirement would move up one
extra point on the summation score, and each case that scored 2 on the equali-
ty requirement would move up two extra points on the summation score. That
Spring, 19851
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means the Grills33 case would move up from a 6 to an 8, and the other three
cases that started at 6 would move up to a 7, because only Grills of the four
cases received a 2 on the equality requirement. Giving the requirement of
equality a weight of 2 when the other criteria receive a weight of 1 is substan-
tively reasonable, since whether equality is required should be especially fun-
damental in determining whether a redistricting is ordered for lack of equality.
The other criteria are less fundamental in that sense.
Instead of or in addition to changing the weights of the criteria, one could
add an additional criterion. For example, the inconsistency would be resolved
if we added a time variable which asks whether the case was decided after the
Maryland case.34 There were only two cases decided after the Maryland case,
namely Grills" and Baker.36 Thus they would be the only cases receiving a 2 on
this new variable. All the others would receive a 1. That would mean the new
set of nine summation scores would be 6, 8, 7, 7, 7, 8, 8, 9, and 8. Unlike the
differential weighting, however, adding that variable is not so substantively
reasonable. That time point was not a watershed in any sense, but rather just
an arbitrary way of separating Grills from the other three cases. That time
variable would have been more meaningful if there had been years rather than
months separating the Maryland case from the Grills case, or if the Maryland
case had established an important new precedent favoring redistricting which
was applicable to Grills.
Another alternative might be to eliminate the Grills case. That does
eliminate the inconsistency. It would be justifiable if the Grills case really did
not belong by virtue of its being a foreign redistricting case, a redistricting of
fire stations rather than legislative districts, or some other substantively mean-
ingful reason. There is no such reason here. Any approach to eliminate incon-
sistencies must also be substantively meaningful. Approaches which do not
work with Table 2 might, however, work with other sets of cases.
Another approach is to change the measurement on one or more predic-
tive criteria. For example, perhaps the requirement of equality could be
measured in three categories, rather than just yes-no. The three categories
might be strongly yes, mildly yes, and no. If the constitution in the Grills case
strongly requires equality, then that case would receive a 3 on the first
variable, and the other three cases would remain at 1. The new summation
scores would then be 7, 6, 6, and 6 for those four cases, which would separate
Grills from the other three cases without creating any new inconsistencies.
Another example might involve noting that the equality violation is rather
crudely measured with a yes-no dichotomy. A more sophisticated measure-
33Grills v. Anderson, 29 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Ind. 1961).
-377 U.S. 656 (1964).
1129 U.S.L.W. 2443 (Ind. 1961).
"'369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ment might ask what is the minimum percentage of the population needed to
elect 51 % of the legislature. The answer could range from a low of about 10%
to a high of 51 %. The Grills case, however, would not receive a substantially
higher score on the degree of equality violation than those other three cases,
since it received a no on the yes-no dichotomy when two of the other three
received a yes.
Another alternative relates to finding an error in how the cases have been
scored on each criterion. If, for example, Grills really deserves a 2 on the third
or fourth variables, then the inconsistency would be resolved. That approach is
more likely where there is more subjectivity in scoring the relations. An error
could also occur in calculating the summation scores if they were calculated by
hand or with a calculator. The microcomputer, however, is not likely to err in
summing the relation scores even if they are multi-dimensional and weighted.
The program also shows intermediate values between the raw scores and the
summation scores to enable the user to check that the summation was done
properly. The intermediate scores show the corresponding part/whole percen-
tages for each raw score to consider multi-dimensionality (which will be
discussed shortly), and weighted raw scores or weighted part/whole percentage
scores to consider differential weighting.
All these changes are directed toward improving predictive decision rules
by (1) having them make more substantive sense and by (2) reducing incon-
sistencies. The changes can be summarized in the form of a checklist in which
each item refers to an input element that is subject to change as follows:
1. Cases or Casetypes
(1) Adding or subtracting
(2) Consolidating or subdividing
(3) Specifying a maximum or minimum on a characteristic of a
casetype
2. Predictive Criteria
(1) Adding or subtracting
(2) Consolidating or subdividing
(3) Specifying a maximum or a minimum on a predictive criterion
3. Relations between Cases and Criteria
(1) More refined or less refined measurement
(2) Alternative units of measurement
(3) Different scoring for some of the relations
Spring, 1985]
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4. Drawing a Conclusion as to the Predictive Decision-Rule
(1) Expanding or contracting the indeterminate area
(2) Changing the upper or lower cut-off
(3) Predicting degrees, rather than a dichotomy or vice versa
(4) Predicting degrees with a non-linear, rather than a linear equation
or a different kind of non-linear equation
(5) Recognizing a constraint such that if it is present, all cases will be
decided positively, or all cases will be decided negatively, regardless
how they score on the predictive criteria.
C. Sensitivity Threshold Analysis
The computer program aids the user in determining which alternative is
best for eliminating inconsistencies. The program does so in various ways. One
way is to inform the user what it would take to move the Grills case up to a tie
with the lowest scoring case in which the attacker won. That kind of threshold
analysis shows how each of the four relation scores or their weights would
have to change. Another way is to inform the user what it would take to move
the other three cases down to a tie with the highest scoring case beneath them
in which the defender won. Probably the best way in which the sensitivity
aspects of the program are helpful here is by enabling one to experiment quick-
ly and accurately with different weights, variables, sets of cases, measurement
units, and relation scores to see what their effects are in terms of new summa-
tion scores and the elimination of previous inconsistencies without introducing
new ones.
A special form of sensitivity or threshold analysis in this substantive con-
text could involve asking what would have enabled Colegrove to be decided in
favor of the attacker the way Baker was. The answer is that it would have
taken a combination of changes great enough to make up the 3-point gap be-
tween the score of 5 which Colegrove received and the score of 8 for Baker.
The gap could be made up if Colegrove could receive a score of 4 on the equali-
ty requirement or Baker a score of -1. Neither change, however, is possible
since that criterion only provides for scores of 1 and 2. The same thing is true
of all the other criteria in that no change on any of them is possible that will
make up the 3-point gap. The threshold analysis also informs us that the gap
could be made up if any one of the first three criterion were to be given a
weight of -2. Then Colegrove would receive weighted relation scores of
-2+ I + 1 +2 which sum to +2, and Baker would receive scores of
-4 + 2 + 2 + 2 adding to + 2 just like Colegrove. A -2 weight, however, makes
no substantive sense for any of the first three variables. No weight will help
Colegrove for the fourth variable. Both Colegrove and Baker receive the same
raw score on that variable, since they were both decided in federal courts.
[Vol. 18:4
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TABLE 3
An Example of the Computer Display: Threshold Analysis37
Threshold Analysis Colegrove vs Baker
Eq. Requ Legis. S Eq. Viol Court Fe
Coleg 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00
Baker -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
Weight -2.000 -2.000 -2.000 ????
The threshold analysis is summarized in Table 3. The first row indicates
the threshold values for the Colegrove case on each of the four variables. The
second row indicates the threshold values for the Baker case. The third row in-
dicates the threshold weights for each of the four predictive criteria. This
analysis informs us that it would have been virtually impossible for Colegrove
to have been decided any other way in view of the validity and meaning of
these predictive variables, plus other variables that also disfavored Colegrove.
To apply the decision rule of Table 2, one needs a new case that is not in-
cluded in the data set from which the decision rule was generated. If the next
case after Baker involves no equality requirement, a state legislature, a severe
equality violation, and a federal court, then the case would have 7 unweighted
points. We would then predict victory for the attacker, since 6.5 is the cutoff
summation score. If we weight the equality requirement by 2, then the new
case would have a weighted summation score of 8. We would still predict vic-
tory, since the cutoff score with the weights is 7.5. We could test the predictive
power of the methodology by predicting Case 3 from the first two, Case 4 from
the first three, and so on. If we do that, we will predict accurately each time,
provided that we use the weighting system whereby scores on the equality re-
quirement are doubled, while the other scores remain unchanged.38
"The object here is to determine what it would take to bring Colegrove up to the same summation score as
Baker, or to bring Baker down to the same summation score as Colegrove.
Each cell shows the threshold value of a relation or a weight. If an actual cell value in Table I were to
change to its above threshold value, then there would be a tie between Colegrove and Baker, assuming all
the other inputs are held constant.
No one threshold value can equalize Colegrove and Baker given the four criteria. All the threshold values
are above or below the measurement range of 1-2. There is also no substantive sense for the weights of any
of those predictive variables to be negative rather than positive.
3 The cases dealing with legislative redistricting are discussed in R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION:
REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968) and REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's (Polsby ed., 1971).
For further detail on this predictive example, see Nagel, Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction.
42 TEX. L. REV. 1006 (1964). Other variables that also disfavored Colegrove include (1) the intervening case
of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), which ordered redistricting where blacks were being
districted out of the city limits of Tuskegge, Alabama, (2) the partial reliance in the Colegrove case on the
clause that guarantees a republican form of government, rather than the equal protection clause, (3) the in-
creased public sensitivity to denials of equality between 1946 and 1962, (4) the increased malapportionment
between 1946 and 1962, especially as a result of increased urban and suburban growth with virtually no new
redistricting, and (5) the request in Colegrove for redistricting in time for the next congressional election
which was only a few months away. The threshold weight of -2 is calculated by the computer by solving for
USING MICROCOMPUTERSSpring, 19851
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MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY AND HOUSING DISCRIMINATION CASES
Table 4 contains data for predicting housing discrimination cases in light
of Shelley v. Kraemer 9. That case held that covenants in deeds are unen-
forceable which prohibit the owner from selling to a black buyer, at least
where a neighbor is seeking an injunction against a willing seller as a matter of
the neighbors' property rightsi ° To predict related housing discrimination
cases, it is useful to know how each case is positioned on the four predictive
criteria of (1) whether the seller is willing to sell, (2) whether there is an in-
terfering neighbor seeking to enjoin the sale, (3) whether the buyer is abusive
in some way so that the seller would be legally right in not selling regardless of
the racial matter, and (4) whether the claim of the plaintiff is based on a con-
stitutional violation, a breach of contract, a personal injury, or a property
violation. The sale is more likely to be upheld if the seller is willing, the plain-
tiff is an interfering neighbor, and the buyer is not abusive. The sale is also
more likely to be upheld if the claim is based on a violation of constitutional
law, contract law, tort law, or property law in that order.
W (or the threshold weight) in the equation, W I + I + I + 2 = W2 + 2 + 2 + 2. That equation simplifies to
WI +4 = W2+6, which in turn simplifies to 2W-IW = 4-6. Thus IW = -2.
"9334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 20.
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To illustrate the problem of multi-dimensionality in predictive criteria,
Table 4 only uses criteria 1 and 4 which relate to the willingness of the seller
and the nature of the claim. The multi-dimensionality problem involves the
fact that the willingness of the seller is measured in terms of a yes-no
dichotomy, whereas the nature of the claim is measured in terms of four
categories. With two categories on one criterion and four on the other, there
are eight casetypes, as listed at the left of Table 4. Column 1 shows how the
eight casetypes score on the willingness variable, and column 3 shows how
they score on the claim variable. Column 5 adds those raw relation-scores
together to obtain an unweighted raw sum. Column 6 shows that the sale will
be allowed if the seller is willing. If the seller is unwilling, the outcome depends
partly on the other variables which are not included in Table 4.
Where the predictive variables are measured differently, merely summing
the raw scores produces distorted results. That would be more obvious if one
predictive criterion were measured in miles, and a second predictive criterion
were measured in pounds. The results are also distorted if a case receives 4
points for being in the best category on the claim variable, while a case receives
only 2 points for being in the best category on the willingness variable. That is
due to the coincidence that the claim variable has four categories, and the will-
ingness variable has only two categories. Partly to remedy that situation, the
relation scores are transformed into part/whole percentages which are not in-
fluenced by whether a variable is measured in miles, pounds, a yes-no
dichotomy, or a 1-4 scale.
To transform the relation scores on a given criterion or column, one mere-
ly sums the numbers in the column to obtain a total or whole. For example,
the sum of the first column is 12. One then divides each number or part in the
column by the whole in order to obtain a part/whole percentage for each rela-
tion score. For example, the part/whole percentage corresponding to the first
relation score in column 1 is 1/12 or 8%. Now instead of adding the raw scores
of column 1 to those of column 3 in order to obtain the unweighted raw sum of
column 5, one adds the part/whole percentages of column 2 to the part/whole
percentages of column 4 to obtain the sum of the unweighted part/whole
percentages of column 7. For example, adding 8% in column 2 to 5% in col-
umn 3 gives 13% in column 7.
Notice that by working with just the unweighted raw sum there are three
inconsistencies out of eight cases. The three inconsistencies are cases 2, 3, and
4. They have unweighted sums that are as high as cases 5, 6, and 7. Cases 2, 3,
and 4, however, have unclear outcomes, whereas cases 5, 6, and 7 resulted in
[Vol. 18:4
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the sale being allowed. By working with the sum of the unweighted part/whole
percentages, there are only two inconsistencies. They are cases 3 and 4. They
have unweighted part/whole percentages larger than cases 5 and 6. Cases 3 and
4, however, have unclear outcomes, whereas cases 5 and 6 resulted in the sale
being allowed. All the inconsistencies can be eliminated by recognizing that
the willingness of the seller is more important than the nature of the claim. If
willingness is given a weight of 2, then the sum of the weighted p/w%'s for the
first casetype is twice 8% plus 5% for a total of 21 %. If one does likewise for
each of the eight casetypes, one obtains the sums of weighted p/w%'s shown in
column 8. The percents in that column are in perfect ascending order, such
that there are no inconsistencies. If a casetype has a sum of weighted p/w%'s
of .39 or higher, then the willing seller wins and the sale is allowed. If a
casetype has a sum of weighted p/w%'s of .36 or lower, then the unwilling
seller may be allowed to get out of the sale depending on whether or not the
buyer is abusive."
OUTCOME RANGES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES
Table 5 contains data for predicting international law cases where the
United States is a party. The object is to predict the probability that the United
States will win from at least two predictive criteria. The predictive criteria are
the source of law and the industrial power of the U.S. opponent. They are two
criteria from a larger list of seven, which also includes (1) the international law
subject matter and the U.S. position on it, (2) the decision-making tribunal, (3)
the economic interests that may be involved and the U.S. position on them, (4)
the civil liberty interests that may be involved and the U.S. position on them,
and (5) the nature of the plaintiff as a legal entity.
"Cases dealing with housing discrimination are discussed in J. KUSHNER. FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN
REAL ESTATE. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION (1983); R. SCHWEMM. HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION LAW (1983), and N DORSEN. supra note 12, at 940-46. For further details on this predictive
example, see Nagel, Case Prediction by Staircase Tables and Percentaging, 25 JURIMETRICS 168 (1985).
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TABLE 5
Data for Predicting International Law Cases with the US. as a Party45
Criteria
Source of Law U.S. Opponent Sum' Outcome"7
Casetypes
1. Foreign Law and
Less Industrial Opponent 1 1 2 40%
2. Foreign Law and
Non-Country Opponent 1 2 3 48
3. Treaty and
Less Industrial Opponent 2 1 3 51
4. Foreign Law and
Equal Opponent 1 3 4 62
5. International Law and
Less Industrial Opponent 3 1 4 56
6. Treaty and
Non-Country Opponent 2 2 4 58
7. International Law and
Non-Country Opponent 3 2 5 63
8. Treaty and
Equal Opponent 2 3 5 73
9. U.S. Law and
Less Industrial Opponent 4 1 5 70
10. International Law and
Equal Opponent 3 3 6 78
11. U.S. Law and
Non-Country Opponent 4 2 6 78
12. U.S. Law and
Equal Opponent 4 3 7 92
5Table 5 only deals with two of the seven variables in the international law cases. The two are the main
source of law and the industrial power of the United States opponent. The source of law includes United
States law, international law, a treaty, and foreign law. The United States opponent can be equal to the
United States, not a country, or less than the United States in industrial power. Only two variables are used
in Table 4 rather than seven, partly because of the temporary limitation to 15 alternatives. One can handle
all seven variables through multiple runs with 15 casetypes per run. The number of casetypes, however, is
163,800 since the number of categories per variable of 4, 13, 6, 5, 5, 3, and 7 respectively. Under those cir-
cumstances, one would not want to list all the casetypes. Instead, one would want to know what the proba-
bility of United States victory is for any combination of seven categories. To estimate that, simply average
the seven probabilities of United States victory. The above data comes from Nagel, Judicial Prediction
Analysis from Empirical Probability Tables, 41 IND. L. J. 403-19 (1966).
4The decision rule which the above data generates is Y = .20 + . 10(x), where Y is the probability of the
United States winning and X is the summation score. The decision rule could also be expressed as a series of
if-then statements like (1) if X is 1, then Y is .30; (2) If X is 2, Y is .40; (3) If X is 3, Y is .50; (4) If X is 4, Y is
.60; (5) If X is 5, Y is .70; (6) If X is 6, Y is .80; and (7) If X is 7, Y is .90. The above prediction equation
comes from observing the relation between the summation scores and the outcome probabilities in Table 5.
One can determine the prediction equation more accurately by using a statistical calculation that can easily
arrive at such an equation for 12 pairs of inputs. One can also think in terms of six pairs of input for the sum-
mation scores from 2 to 7. Thus a score of 4 had an average outcome of .57 since Casetype 6 had an outcome
of .56 and Casetype 8 had an outcome of .58.
"The outcome figures shown above come from averaging the two probabilities from the two variables used
for each casetype. Thus, the combination of United States law and equal power has a .92 probability because
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:4
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The source of the law refers to the four categories of (1) domestic law of
another country (the U.S. is victorious in only 25% of such cases), (2) an inter-
national treaty (47% victorious), (3) international law/custom (56%), and (4)
U.S. domestic law (85%). The industrial power of the U.S. opponent refers to
the three categories of (1) less industrial power than the U.S. (the U.S. is vic-
torious in only 56% of such cases), (2) non-countries (70% victorious), and (3)
about the same in industrial power (100% victorious although that sub-sample
is small). The victory probabilities are based on an analysis of the 137 cases
contained in four leading international law casebooks.
With four categories on one criterion and three categories on the second
criterion, there are 12 casetypes, as shown at the left side of Table 5. The sum-
mation column sums the raw scores for each casetype across the variables.
Technically speaking, part/whole percentages should be used since the predic-
tive variables are measured differently via a 1-4 scale and a 1-3 scale. The
scales, however, are close enough to justify working with raw scores at least
for this methodological illustration.
Each probability in the outcome column is arrived at by averaging the
probabilities for the relevant categories on each predictive variable. Thus,
Casetype 1 involves foreign law (25% U.S. victory rate) and a less industrial
U.S. opponent (56% U.S. victory rate). The average between 25% and 56% is
40% rounded to the nearest even number. There are more sophisticated ways
of combining probabilities in accordance with Bayesian probability analysis.
They are, however, highly complicated, especially when more than two predic-
tive variables are involved. The information for a Bayesian analysis is almost
never available since it requires knowing various details on how the predictive
variables relate to each other. Simply averaging the basic probabilities should
provide a sufficient approximation to an overall probability, especially if each
predictive criterion is worded in the direction of winning and does not greatly
overlap the other criteria. Even if the criteria do overlap, the weights can take
that into consideration. Two duplicative criteria, for example, can each be
given about half the weight they would otherwise receive if the other criterion
in the pair were not also being used.
After determining the criteria, casetypes, relations, summation scores,
and outcomes, one should develop a decision rule indicating for various sum-
mation scores what outcomes are likely to occur. This example, however, dif-
fers from the previous examples in that the outcome is a range between 40%
and 92% rather than just a dichotomy of winning versus losing. Having an
United States law has a .85 probability and equal power has a 1.00 probability. This gives an approximation
to a Bayesian conditional, especially where we only have the main probabilities with which to work. Table 5
provides a good illustration of an outcome that is not a dichotomy of win or lose but rather a continuum
outcome of 0 to 1.00.
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outcome range is common in most court cases as well as a win-lose dichotomy.
In damage cases, the dichotomous liability-decision is followed by a continuum
damages-decision when liability is established. Damages can range from a low
of $1 in some libel cases to millions of dollars in treble damage antitrust suits.
In criminal cases, the conviction decision is followed by a sentencing decision
when there is a conviction. Sentences can range from a low of no jail time to
life imprisonment or the death penalty.
In Tables 1 through 5, one could bypass the summation score and for-
mulate a decision rule that specifies for each casetype or case what the out-
come is likely to be. That approach is likely to lead to inconsistencies, as was
shown with the redistricting cases and the housing discrimination cases. It is
also much more clumsy to have to specify how each case or casetype will be
decided, especially if there are many casetypes. With a win-lose dichotomy, the
decision rule simply specifies what summation score separates the winners
from the losers. In predicting a range outcome, there is no such threshold sum-
mation score. Instead, one would like to know the likely outcome at a base
summation score of 0 or 1, and how much the outcome is likely to increase for
each 1-unit increase or 1% increase in the summation score.
Looking at the last two columns of Table 5 tends to generate a decision
rule that Y = .20 + .10(X), where Y is the probability of the U.S. winning,
and X is the summation score. One can see that the two casetypes with sum-
mation scores of 3 average about a .50 probability; the three casetypes that
score 4, average about .60; and the three casetypes that score 5 average about
.70. Extending those relations downward implies or extrapolates that a sum-
mation score of zero would have a probability of about .20. One cannot,
however, score less than a 2 on the two predictive criteria together. At the
other end, that eyeballing approach implies that a summation score of 8 would
have a probability of about 1.00. One cannot, however, score more than 7 on
the predictive criteria. Thus, the eyeballed or linear relation is not subject to
the criticism that it leads to probabilities below zero or above 1.00 since all the
possible summation scores lead to reasonable probabilities when using the deci-
sion rule Y = .20 + .10(X).
Greater precision may sometimes be required than the eyeballing ap-
proach provides. Under those circumstances, one can insert into a statistical
calculator the 12 pairs of numbers, consisting of 2 and .40, 3 and .48, and so
on. After keying in those 24 numbers, one can read out the value of the con-
stant which is. 19 rather than .20, and the value of the slope which is slightly
more than. 10. The computer program will do that kind of statistical regression
analysis directly when the PIG% program is further developed.
[Vol. 18:4
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One can also obtain a decision rule which reflects diminishing returns of
the form Y = .24(X)65 by inserting the same 24 numbers and asking for
diminishing returns output. With that equation, a summation score of 1
predicts a probability of .24, and a summation score of 2 predicts a probability
of .38. Each successive increment on the summation score increases the prob-
ability, but at a diminishing rate. The .65 means that if the summation score
doubles (i.e., increases by 100%), then the probability will increase by about
65%. For example if the summation scores doubles from 1 to 2, then the
predicted probability goes up from .24 to .38. The .14 difference is about 65%
of the .24 base. Diminishing returns is a fact of life in the relation between
most inputs and most outputs, but linear relations often give good enough
predictability. With the aid of the microcomputer program, one can request
how one wants the summation scores related to the range outcomes with equal
ease, regardless whether one chooses constant returns, diminishing returns, or
other available options.48
MULTIPLE WEIGHTS FOR PREDICTIVE CRITERIA AND CRIMINAL CASES
Table 6 contains data for predicting criminal cases. The data is purely
hypothetical, unlike any of the previous five tables. For methodological pur-
poses, however, hypothetical data should be just as usable as real data. This
data is not only hypothetical, it is also symbolic data, meaning the cases and
criteria only have letters not names. The advantage of such data is that it
enables one to see the methodology more clearly without substance getting in
the way. Another advantage is that this particular set of hypothetical data is
the first court-case prediction problem with which this author dealt back in
1960. This example thus illustrates some important changes over the past 25
years in systematic quantitative judicial prediction.
'The international law casebooks which provide the data base for this example are W. BISHOP. INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1953); M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1951); M. KATZ& K. BREWSTER, INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS & RELATIONS (1960); L. ORFIELD & E. RE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955). For further details on
this predictive example, see Nagel, Judicial Prediction and Analysis from Empirical Probability Tables, 41
IND. L.J. 403 (1966). Working with probabilities of victory and average damages under various circum-
stances can be facilitated by such loose-leaf services as those published by the Jury Verdict Research Service.
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TABLE 6
Data for Predicting Hypothetical Criminal Cases9
Criteria"
P Criterion Q Criterion R Criterion S Criterion Unweighted Weighted
(W= +.75) (W= -. 67) (W= + 1.00) (W= +.67) Sum Outcome5  Sum52
Casetypes
1. A 1 2 1 1 5 P 1.09
2. C 2 2 1 1 6 P 2.09
3. B 2 2 2 2 8 D 3.50
4. D 2 1 2 1 6 D 3.50
5. E 2 i 2 2 7 D 4.16
There are five criminal cases called A, B, C, D, and E, although the data is
general enough to be any kind of case. There are four predictive criteria called
P, Q, R, and S. There are thus 20 relations. Each relation is a yes-no di-
chotomy. The criteria are worded in such a way that a yes answer favors the
defense, and a no answer favors the prosecution. If one adds the unweighted
raw relation scores across each case, one obtains unweighted sums of 5, 8, 6, 6,
and 7 for cases A, B, C, D, and E, respectively. Those raw scores generate one
inconsistency out of five opportunities, since both case C and D have 6 points,
but C was decided in favor of the prosecution and D in the favor of the
defense.
The best way to eliminate inconsistencies is generally by giving the predic-
tive criteria different weights, rather than having the same weight for all the
criteria. The best way to determine those weights is generally in terms of the
relative substantive importance of the variables as known to reasonably
knowledgeable people. That is what was once done (1) in the cases dealing with
religion in the public schools, in saying educational purpose is an exemption
variable and compulsory participation is a constraint variable, (2) in the
redistricting cases, in saying the presence of an equality requirement is more
"The above data comes from Nagel, Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions, 7 PRAC. LAW.
68-74 (1961).
"There are various ways in which one can assign weights to predictive criteria. The method used here is to
determine the correlation coefficient of each predictive variable with whether the prosecution or defendant
wins. In other words, outcome can be considered a dichotomous Y variable to be correlated with the X I, X2,
X3, and X4 predictive criteria.
This is a good example of the use of weights for the predictive variables.
"A "P" in the outcome column means the prosecution wins. A "D" means the defense wins.
"The decision rule which the above data generates is: (I) If the weighted summation score is 3.50 or above,
the defendant wins. (2) With a summation score of 2.09 or below, the prosecution wins. (3) If the weighted
summation score is between 2.09 and 3.50 the result is unclear. The weighted summation scores are
calculated by multiplying the raw scores on each predictive criterion by the weight of the criterion. Those
products are then added across each case. There is one inconsistency with the unweighted summation
scores, but no inconsistencies with the weighted summation scores.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:4
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important than the other variables, and (3) in the housing discrimination cases,
in saying the willingness of the seller is more important than the field of law.
The best tests of how well the cases have been weighted are whether the
weighting makes substantive sense, and whether the weighting results in a
perfect separation of the winning cases from the losing cases.
An alternative weighting method is to weight the criteria in terms of their
association with the outcome that one is trying to predict. That is what is done
in Table 7. That table shows how the weights for Table 6 were determined. For
example, criterion P has a weight of + .75 because 75% of the cases that had P
present resulted in victory for the defense, whereas 0% of the cases that had P
absent resulted in victory for the defense. By subtracting those two percen-
tages, one obtains a constant of zero and a slope of .75 in an equation of the
form Y = 0 + .75(X). Y is the case outcome (with 0 for P and 1 for D), and X
is the general predictive criterion (with 0 for absent and 1 for present). Thus if
the predictive criterion moves from 0 to 1, the outcome then moves from a
probability of 0% for the defense winning on up to 75%. The other four sub-
tables of Table 7 can be interpreted the same way to yield equations of the
form Y = 1.00 - .67(Q); Y = 0 + 1.00(R); and Y = .33 + .67(S).
TABLE 7
Weighting Predictive Criteria by Association with Outcome53
P Criterion Q Criterion
No Yes No Yes
Defense Defense
Wins Wins
0 3 2 1
0% 75% +.75 100% 33% -. 67
Prosecutor Prosecutor
Wins Wins
1 1 0 2
100% 25% 0% 67%
Totals 1 4 5 Totals 2 3 5
100% 100% 100% 100%
"
3There are always five cases regardless of the predictive variable that one is relating to outcome.
Each sub-table shows how the five cases are positioned on absence or presence of the variable and
whether the defense or prosecution won.
Each sub-table has four cells because there are two categories on each variable being related. It is purely
coincidental that there happen to be four variables.
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Weighting Predictive Criteria by Association with Outcome
R Criterion S Criterion
No Yes No Yes
Defense Defense
Wins Wins
0 3 1 2
0% 100% +1.00 33% 100% +.67
Prosecutor Prosecutor
Wins Wins
2 0 2 0
100% 0% 67% 0%
Totals 2 3 5 Totals 3 2 5
100% 100% 100% 100%
Those four slopes or weights can be used to weight the predictive criteria
especially if those variables are independent of each other. If their lack of in-
dependence is great enough to produce inconsistencies, then the weights can be
adjusted in light of the known overlap among the variables until the incon-
sistencies are eliminated. The weights can also be adjusted in light of the
relative substantive importance of the variables. Those weights may not have
been adequately measured by the kind of relational analysis shown in Table 7
due to problems of (1) reciprocal causation whereby prior case outcomes in-
fluence what evidence variables are subsequently introduced, (2) spurious
causation whereby both the case outcome and the presence of an evidence
variable are influenced by other common factors, and (3) multicolinearity
whereby the predictive criteria influence each other in terms of overlap, in-
teraction, and interference.
Notice that with the weights from Table 7 introduced into Table 6, the
weighted sums for the cases proceed in perfect ascending order. All the defense
cases now have higher weighted summation scores than any of the prosecution
cases which was not so with the unweighted sums. The decision rule is that the
defendant wins with a weighted summation score of at least 3.50, and the pros-
ecution wins with a weighted summation score of at most 2.09. Between 2.09
and 3.50 is a gray area that requires more cases to resolve.5
'Cases dealing with criminal law prediction are discussed in W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW (1972).For the forerunner of this predictive example, see Nagel, Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Deci-
sions, 7 PRAC. LAW. 68 (1961).
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Comparing Table 7 with Tables 1 through 6 indicates that there are two
major ways of using a matrix for prediction purposes. One way is the essence
of P/G% prediction. It involves cases or casetypes on the rows and predictive
criteria on the columns. The other way is the essence of statistical prediction. It
involves categories of the outcome variable shown on the rows, and categories
of one predictive criterion shown on the columns. The first kind of matrix is a
data matrix, and the second kind is a cross-tabulation matrix. Cross-tabulation
is generally preceded by the preparation of a data matrix. P/G% prediction
uses a data matrix to make predictions without the matrix being preliminary to
a subsequent matrix, although PIG% prediction may rearrange the cases to
put them in the order of their summation scores in order to see more clearly
the optimum predictive decision-rule.
P/G% data-matrix prediction has advantages over cross-tabulation
prediction. A data matrix can show any kind of measurement for the predic-
tive criteria or the outcome variable. Cross tabulation tends to be confined to
dichotomies or a limited number of categories on each variable. Along related
lines, a data matrix works with raw data that is not likely to have been sub-jected to distorting transformations. A data matrix can show any number of
predictive variables, but a cross-tabulation table is generally confined to only
one predictive variable. A data matrix in the PIG% context is a working tool
for suggesting predictive decision-rules and action strategies, whereas a cross-
tabulation table tends to be a visual aid for showing results that have already
been determined. One might note that some of the defects of a cross-tabulation
table are not present in statistical regression analysis, such as arbitrary
categorizing and being confined to one predictive variable at a time. Regres-
sion analysis may, however, have other even more serious disadvantages to
which we now turn.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION, STAIRCASE PREDICTION, AND PIG% PREDICTION
One might ask why not do a multivariate regression analysis from the
start, instead of doing a set of bivariate regression analyses like those shown in
Table 7, in order to obtain the weights for a PIG% prediction analysis. Such a
multivariate analysis would have the form Y = a + bP + b2Q + b3R + bS.
Each b represents a regression weight which statistically controls for multi-di-
mensionality and overlap. The main advantage of that approach is its mechan-
ical objectivity once the data table has been determined. Multiple regression
analysis, however, is more complicated to do and present, although it has
recently been made less complicated by the availability of microcomputer flop-
py discs which can quickly process a set of data like that shown in Tables 1-6 in
order to generate the constant and the regression weights for the variables.
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Disadvantages of a multiple regression approach are:
1. It cannot guarantee perfect prediction of the past cases on which the
equation is based unless one uses the same substantive-reasoning
methods for eliminating inconsistencies as the methods associated with
PIG% prediction.
2. The same above problems of invalidity occur with multivariate regres-
sion as with bivariate regression (including reciprocal causation, spuri-
ous causation, and multicolinearity) since both approaches use the
same relatively mechanical methods to arrive at weights, as contrasted
to using knowledgeable insiders who can separate out those problems.
3. Regression analysis cannot meaningfully relate summation scores to
winning or losing the way a threshold decision rule can, because a
regression equation requires that as the predictor variable increases,
the predicted variable must also change. A threshold decision rule
recognizes that the same low scores may all lead to losing, and the
same high scores may all lead to winning.
4. Weighting the predictive criteria substantively as was done with
Tables 1, 2, and 4 is much easier methodologically than arranging for a
multivariate regression analysis. Likewise, the bivariate analysis of
Table 6 is much easier than a multivariate analysis even if the criteria
are not all measured in yes-no dichotomies. One can then determine a
bivariate regression weight with a statistical calculator, as mentioned
in discussing Table 5, rather than with a four-cell cross-tabulation
table.
5. One could express the idea of summing the unweighted raw scores as a
regression equation of the form Y = a + blP + b2Q + b3R + b4S,
where "a" equals zero, and each "b" equals 1. That only complicates
the summation rule, and provides no information as to what Y score
leads to winning and what Y score leads to losing.
6. Regression analysis, like statistical techniques in general, requires a lot
of random cases to be meaningful. That means at least 30 cases if one
wants to have a representative sample randomly drawn from a larger
data set. Sample size is important because regression analysis involves
inductively arriving at generalizations. PIG% mainly involves deduc-
tively reasoning that (1) if a certain case is decided positively, then it
would be decided even more positively with additional favorable
variables; (2) if a certain case is decided negatively, then it will be decid-
ed even more negatively with fewer favorable variables; (3) if a certain
case is decided positively or negatively with variable X present, then it
will also be similarly decided with variable X2 substituted where X2 is
analogous or similar to Xi.
7. One cannot legitimately change the weights in regression analysis.
They are locked in by the requirement that the weights must minimize
IV&l 18:4
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the sum of the squared deviations of the predicted scores from the ac-
tual scores. One can legitimately change the weights in PIG% predic-
tion if doing so makes substantive sense and reduces inconsistencies.
Making substantive sense and reducing inconsistencies is a more mean-
ingful criterion than the least squares criterion.
8. Multivariate regression analysis may be the most sophisticated and
widely used statistical method for predicting incidents or cases from
variables. In light of the five points above, however, the method is (1)
too imperfect in its predictive power, (2) too invalid in its attempt to
describe empirical realities, (3) too irrelevant for predicting what is
essentially a kinked or threshold relationship rather than a smooth
straight or curved line, (4) too complicated, (5) too incomplete in ex-
pressing summation relations, (6) too demanding of large samples, and(7) too inflexible in not allowing one to change the predictive weights.
At the opposite extreme from the mechanical quantification of
multivariate statistical regression analysis is the method of staircase prediction.
It can be done with no quantification at all. It basically involves showing one
predictive criterion along the horizontal axis of a two-dimensional matrix, with
its categories shown as columns in ascending order toward winning. A second
predictive criteria is shown along the vertical axis, with its categories shown as
rows also in ascending order toward winning. The actual or presumed out-
comes are then shown in the cells for each combination of categories express-
ing the outcomes in words or symbols, but not necessarily numbers. One can
then see that as one moves from the southwest corner of the matrix toward the
northeast, losing changes to winning. One can section off the losing cells from
the winning cells with a thick kinked line that looks like a staircase.
That kind of staircase analysis, like P/G% prediction, does stimulate more
careful thinking than multivariate regression analysis about the order of the
categories on the variables and what the key variables are. It is also capable of
working with a sample size of a few, one, or even no key cases by deducing out-
comes for casetypes, as contrasted to multivariate regression analysis which
needs many diverse cases with actual outcomes. Such an empirical sample may
often be nonexistent. Staircase analysis is also a useful visual aid, like drawing
indifference curves in economics or probability analysis.
On the other hand, staircase prediction is limited almost completely to
situations where there are only two predictive variables because it is virtually
impossible or at least quite difficult to use the two-dimensional matrix ap-
proach when adding a third or fourth variable. The staircase approach is also
incapable of handling the assigning of different weights to the variables
without introducing quantitative methods, especially if the variables are
measured on different scales.
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Multiple regression, staircase prediction, and PIG% prediction all have in
common that they are systematic approaches to arriving at predictive decision-
rules from a set of cases, criteria for distinguishing the cases, and the relations
between the cases and the criteria. Those methods can be contrasted with un-
systematic methods which involve relying on a holistic gestalt approach that
does not disaggregate the decision-rule components into specific cases criteria,
and relations. A holistic approach tends to lack precision, validity, objectivity
and transferability. Its main advantage is that it requires little thinking, and
the quality of results may therefore suffer substantially, although a combina-
tion holistic and disaggregated approach may be better than either alone."
In conclusion, PIG% prediction can be considered more meaningful than
multiple regression since P/G% has the advantages of quantitative regression
without the above disadvantages. It can also be considered more meaningful
than staircase prediction since P/G% has the qualitative and verbal advan-
tages of staircase prediction without its limiting disadvantages. In addition, the
P/G% approach has the simplicity of being usable via the kind of analysis
shown in this article, or via the readily available PIG% microcomputer pro-
gram .S6
APPENDIX 1: FURTHER EXAMPLES OF P/G% PREDICTION
Data for Predicting Welfare Cases
Criteria
Substance Procedural Sum Outcome
Severity Severity
Casetypes
1. Eligibility Denied and
No Attorney Appointed 1.00 0.99 1.99 L
2. Benefits Reduced and
No Attorney Appointed 2.00 0.99 2.99 L
3. Eligibility Denied
and No Hearing 1.00 2.00 3.00 L
"On multiple regression analysis at an introductory level, see A. EDWARDS, AN INTRODUCTION To LINEAR
REGRESSION AND CORRELATION (1976), and E. TUFTE, DATA ANALYSIS FOR POLITiCS AND POLICY (1974). On
staircase prediction, see Nagel, Case Prediction by Staircase Tables and Percentaging, 25 JURIMETRICS 168
(1985).
6For additional examples and aspects of P/G% prediction and evaluation, see NAGEL, MICROCOM-
PUTERS AS DECISION-MAKING AIDS IN LAW PRACTICE (1985). This book of materials will be used
in a course on that title, offered by the Committee on Continuing Professional Education of the American
Law Institute and the American Bar Association on May 10-1 I, 1985. The microcomputer program is
available from the author on request for $20 to cover the cost of an IBM floppy disk, the manual, postage,
and handling. The program was written with John Long of the University of Illinois.
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APPENDIX 1: FURTHER EXAMPLES OF P/G% PREDICTION (Continued)
Data for Predicting Welfare Cases
Criteria
Substance Procedural Sum Outcome
Severity Severity
Casetypes
4. Termination and
No Attorney Appointed 3.00 0.99 3.99 L
5. Benefits Reduced
and No Hearing 2.00 2.00 4.00 ?
6. Eligibility Denied
and No Reasons 1.00 3.01 4.01 W
7. Criminal Prosecution and
No Attorney Appointed 4.00 0.99 4.99 W
8. Termination and
No Hearing 3.00 2.00 5.00 W
9. Benefits Reduced
and No Reasons 2.00 3.01 5.01 W
10. Criminal Prosecution
and No Hearing 4.00 2.00 6.00 W
11. Termination and
No Reasons 3.00 3.01 6.01 W
12. Criminal Prosecution
and No Reasons 4.00 3.01 7.01 W
NOTES:
1. A "W" in the outcome column means the welfare recipient wins. An "L"
means the welfare recipient loses. The Goldberg case is Casetype 7, and the
Argersinger case in Casetype 12.
2. The decision rule which the above data generates is:
(1) If a welfare case involves a summation score of 4.01 or above, the wel-
fare recipient wins.
(2) With a summation score of 3.99 or below, the welfare recipient loses.
(3) With a score of 4.00, the outcome is unclear.
3. The leading case is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). It involved a
summation score of 5.00, and the welfare recipient won. Therefore, one
would expect the welfare recipient to win even more with scores higher
than 5.00. That covers Casetypes 2, 3, 4, and 8.
4. The outcome of Case 12 is known from Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
5. The outcomes of Cases 1, 5, 9, 10 and 11 are known from things said in the
Goldberg case, not from an afortiori deduction.
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6. The above data comes from Nagel, Case Prediction by Staircase Tables and
Percentaging, 25 JURIMETRICS 168 (1985).
Data for Predicting Equal Protection Cases
Criteria
Score On Score On Sum Outcome
Rights Groups
Casetypes
1. Consumers/Region 1 1 2 D
2. Consumers/Economic Class 1 2 3 D
3. Employment/Region 2 1 3 D
4. Consumers/Sex 1 3 4 D
5. Employment/Economic
Class 2 2 4 D
6. Housing/Region 3 1 4 D
7. Employment/Sex 2 3 5 D
8. Housing/Economic Class 3 2 5 D
9. Schools/Region 4 1 5 D
10. Housing/Sex 3 3 6 D
11. Schools/Economic Class 4 2 6 D
12. Consumers/Race 1 6 7 P
13. Criminal Justice/Region 6 1 7 ?
14. Schools/Sex 4 3 7 ?
15. Criminal Justice/Economic
Class 6 2 8 P
16. Employment/Race 2 6 8 P
17. Voting/Region 7 1 8 P
18. Criminal Justice/Sex 6 3 9 P
19. Housing/Race 2 6 9 P
20. Voting/Economic Class 7 2 9 P
21. Schools/Race 4 6 10 P
22. Voting/Sex 7 3 10 P
23. Criminal Justice/Race 6 6 12 P
24. Voting/Race 7 6 13 P
NOTES:
1. The above data can generate two compatible decision rules. One rule is:
(1) If an equal protection case has a summation score of 7 or higher, then
the plaintiff will win.
(2) If the case has a score of 6 or lower, then the defendant will win.
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2. The alternative decision rule is:
(1) If an equal protection case has a summation score greater than 7, then
the plaintiff will win.
(2) If the case has a score of exactly 7, then the outcome is questionable.
(3) If the case has a score of 6 or lower, then the defendant will win.
3. Each casetype is defined in terms of:
(1) The rights that are allegedly being denied which can relate to voting,
criminal justice, schools, housing, employment, or consumer rights in
that order of importance.
(2) The group that is allegedly being given unequal treatment, which can
relate to race (which generally means being black), sex (which generally
means being female), economic class (which generally means being
poor), or region (which generally means being urban or inner city) in
that order of importance.
4. To determine the score of each casetype on the rights, the six rights are ar-
ranged in rank order with the most important right receiving a score of 6.
Slight adjustments are then made to recognize there is more distance be-
tween the top two rights and the bottom four than there is between the
other rights.
5. To determine the score of each casetype on the groups, the four groups are
arranged in rank order with the most important group receiving a score of
4. Slight adjustments are then made to recognize there is more distance be-
tween the top group and the bottom three than there is between the other
groups.
6. The first decision rule implies that the court would decide in favor of the
plaintiff if the state provided grossly unequal right to counsel from one
county to another, or if women were denied admission to an all-male public
school, although the court has not yet done so.
7. The second decision rule implies that being black scores slightly higher than
a 6. That causes 12 to score slightly higher than 7, and thus to be
distinguishable from the questionable cases.
8. Landmark cases or Constitutional amendments that correspond to the
casetypes include Gomillio v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (casetype 24);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (casetype 23); U.S. CONST. amend
XIX (casetype 22); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (casetype
21); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (casetype 20);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (casetype 19); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975) (casetype 18); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(casetype 17); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (casetypes
12 and 16); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (casetype 15); and
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'g
denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
9. The data for this table comes from Nagel, Case Prediction by Staircase
Tables and Percentaging, 25 JURIMETRICS 168 (1985).
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Using the PIG% Approach to Synthesize Case Facts
Criteria (I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Defense Statement Prosecution Statement SUM Weighted Sum(Alibi) (Scene of Crime) SUM N Weighted Sum Sum of Weights
Alternatives W = 2 W = I (l)+(2) (3Y2 (1.5)+(2) (5Y3
Defendant is Guilty .20 ( .40) .70 .90 .45 1.10 .37
Defendant is not Guilty .80 (1.60) .30 1.10 .55 1.90 .63
1.00 (2.00) 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00
NOTES:
1. The numbers in columns 1 and 2 are probabilities. They indicate the degree
of accuracy or truth associated with the statements in the direction of
establishing the defendant's guilt. Thus, the .20 probability means that
there is a .80 probability that the defense statement is true, and the .20 com-
plement is in the direction of establishing the defendant's guilt. These are
probabilities of truth, not probabilities of guilt.
2. The weights indicate the degree of importance of the evidence items. Thus
an alibi statement is quite important (if true) in establishing innocence. A
statement saying the defendant was at the scene of the crime is less impor-
tant because even if it is true, it does not establish the defendant's guilt. The
numbers in parentheses in column 1 are weighted probabilities.
3. The numbers in column 3 are the sum of the two unweighted probabilities.
The numbers in column 5 are the sums of the two weighted probabilities.
4. The numbers in column 4 are unweighted average probabilities. The
numbers in column 5 are weighted average probabilities. The numbers in
column 6 are an approximation of Bayesian conditional probabilities
especially when one only has probabilities of truthfulness and degrees of im-
portance with which to work.
5. If the probability in the upper right hand corner is greater than .90, then thejudge, juror, or other perceiver of these two items of evidence should vote
to convict assuming (1) .90 is accepted as the threshold probability interpre-
tation of beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) these are the only items of evi-
dence. If the starred probability is .90 or less, then one should vote to ac-
quit.
6. With two alibi witnesses, each might receive a weight of 1.5 if one witness
receives a 2. They do not both receive a 2 because they partly reinforce each
other.
7. No set of weights will cause the weighted average to exceed .90 with proba-
bilities of .20 and .70. Thus, there is no threshold value for either W1 or
W2.
8. The difficulty of obtaining a set of evidence items across the prosecution
and the defense that average better than a .90 probability may indicate thatjurors and judges generally operate below the .90 threshold, even though
judges and commentators say that .90 is roughly the probability translation
of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
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APPENDIX 2. THE COMPUTER OUTPUT FOR GOING FROM CASES, CRITERIA, AND
SCORES TO A PREDICTIVE CONCLUSION
The Nine Redistricting Cases and How They Were Decided
Previous
Alternative Outcome
I. Colegrove D Wins
2. Grills A
3. Maryland D
4. Scholle D
5. WMCA D
6. Asbury A
7. Dyer A
8. Baker A
9. Magraw A
NOTE:
I. These are nine key cases on the subject of legislative redistricting decided between Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946) and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
The Four Predictive Criteria and How They Are Measured and Weighted
Criterion Meas. Unit Weight
1. = Required Yes/2 No/I 1.00
2. State Legis. 1.00
3. = Violated 1.00
4. Fed. Court 1.00
NOTES:
1. The first criterion is whether or not the relevant constitution required equal population per legislative
district.
2. The second criterion is whether the legislature in question was a state legislature or the federal Congress.
3. The third criterion is whether the degree of equality violation is great enough that less than 35% of the
state's population could choose more than 50% of the legislative body or congressional delegation.
4. The fourth criterion is whether the court deciding the case was a federal or state court.
5. All the criteria are worded so that a yes answer is favorable to a victory for the side attacking the prevail-
ing redistricting.
The Scores of the Cases on the Criteria
Alternative/Criteria Scoring
= Requi State Le = Viola Fed. Cour
Colegrove 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00
Grills 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Maryland 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Scholle 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
WMCA 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00
Asbury 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00
Dyer 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Baker 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Magraw 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
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The Initial Predictive Conclusion with Equal Weights for the Criteria
Combined Previous
Alternative Rawscores Outcome
1. Colegrove 5.00 D Wins
2. Grills 6.00 A
3. Maryland 6.00 D
4. Scholle 6.00 D
5. WMCA 6.00 D
6. Asbury 7.00 A
7. Dyer 7.00 A
8. Baker 8.00 A
9. Magraw 8.00 A
NOTE:
1. The decision rule for the above table is that if the combined raw scores for a case equal 7 or above, the at-
tacker wins. If the combined raw scores equal 6 or below, the defender wins, but with one inconsistency,
namely the Grills case where the attacker won.
The Predictive Conclusion with Double Weight for the Most Important
Criteria
Combined Previous
Alternative Rawscores Outcome
I. Colegrove 6.00 D Wins
2. Grills 8.00 A
3. Maryland 7.00 D
4. Scholle 7.00 D
5. WMCA 7.00 D
6. Asbury 9.00 A
7. Dyer 9.00 A
8. Baker 10.00 A
9. Magraw 10.00 A
NOTE:
1. Note that as the result of giving the equality requirement a weight of 2 in the Scores of the Cases Table
the inconsistency is removed in the Initial Predictive Conclusion Table whereby the Grills case received
only 6 points, but yet the attacker won.
2. The decision rule for the above table is that if the combined raw scores for a case equal 8 or above, the at-
tacker wins. If the combined raw scores equal 7 or below, the defender wins, with no inconsistencies.
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